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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS AND
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENTS
CARL ZOLLMANN*
The important and well-rounded opinion of the New York
Court of Appeals in Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Cor-
poration et al., to the effect that a hydroplane while on the water
is a ship subject to the admiralty jurisdiction and hence beyond
the jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission of
the state within whose territorial confines the accident has occurred
has been a landmark during the twelve years that it has been on
the books. Says Cardozo, J., in writing the opinion of the court:
The latest of Man's devices for locomotion has invaded the navigable
waters, the most ancient of his highways. Riding at anchor is a new craft
which would have mystified the Lord High Admiral in the days when he
was competing for jurisdiction with Coke and the courts of the common law.'
The question whether the interstate commerce clause has a
similar but, of course, a more far-reaching effect is very interest-
ing since aviation in its most useful phases is interstate and even
international rather than intrastate. The opportunity to raise this
question was presented to counsel for the employer in two recent
cases. In Colonial Air Transport, Inc., et al. v. Edna Tallman,
a Connecticut corporation employed a pilot at its main office in
New York. The flight was from Massachusetts to New Jersey.
The crash occurred in Connecticut. The Court of Appeals with-
out an opinion2 affirmed a decision of the Appellate Division which
was also rendered without an opinion," upholding an award of the
New York Industrial Commission in favor of the wife of the
pilot. In Murray v. Industrial Accident Commission et al.,4 a Cali-
fornia resident by mail made a contract with a Missouri pilot to
fly an airplane (just purchasesd in Missouri) to California. The
crash occurred in California. The petitioner appeared in person.
The opinion of the Supreme Court bears unmistakable evidence of
generally careful presentment of the case by counsel for the em-
ployer. The question of interstate commerce, however, was not
raised (so far as appears from the opinion), and an award in
*Professor of Law, Marquette University School of Law.
1. 232 N. Y. 115, 133 N. E. 371, 18 A. L. R. 1324 (1921).
2. 259 N. Y. 512 (1932).
3. 234 App. Dlv. 809, 253 N. Y. S. 938 (1932).
4. 216 Cal. 340, 14 P. (2d) 301 (1932) ; reversing 10 P. (2d) 97 (1932).
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favor of the petitioner was affirmed. Whether the passage of the
Air Commerce Act by Congress and the Air Commerce Regula-
tions adopted by the Department of Commerce under such Act
take all interstate aviation out of the jurisdiction of the various
industrial accident commissions is therefore an open question so
far as decisions are concerned. 5
This leaves the question of intrastate aviation to be considered.
It has been contended that the Wisconsin statute, which adopts in
large measure the provisions of the Air Commerce Regulations,
excludes the state Workmen's Compensation Commission from all
jurisdiction over aviation cases. The court in answering this con-
tention says:
It does not appear that either Congress or the Department of Commerce
has adopted any rule as to the compensation of injured employees, or the
relative rights and obligations of employees and employers in cases of injury
to the former while engaged in the employment. As those subjects do not
necessarily require a general system or uniformity of regulation, the power
of Congress in relation to them is not exclusive, and consequently the states
may act within their respective jurisdictions until Congress does act and
thus by the exercise of its authority overrides all conflicting state legislation.
Consequently, the state Workmen's Compensation Act is applicable to em-
ployees and employers who are engaged merely in intrastate aircraft navi-
gation, if they are otherwise subject to its provisions. There is no reason
to hold the state Workmen's Compensation Act inapplicable to such an em-
ployee unless at the time of the injury he was engaged in interstate commerce
or in work so closely related. thereto as to be a part thereof.6
It may therefore be taken as settled that intrastate flying
is within the local workmen's compensation acts, so far as the
interstate commerce clause is concerned. The cases hereinafter
referred to bear out this conclusion though they do not discuss
this problem but rather assume that the local compensation com-
mission has jurisdiction over accidents arising out of intrastate
aviation.
The development of aviation as an industry is certain to
bring into the courts an ever-increasing number of compensation
cases involving flying. In view of this situation it will be now
in order to restate the cases which have already arisen as the
principles announced in them will be of the greatest importance
in the cases which are to arise.
The obligations of the compensation act being created by
statute arise out of the status of employer and employee. How
5. See the article by Roy E. Roos on page 1 of this issue.
6. Sheboygan Airways Inc., et al. v. Industrial Commission, 209 Wis. 352.
361, 245 N. W. 178, 182 (132) ; reversing 1932 U. S. Av. R. 222.
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that status has been created is immaterial. The statute applies
automatically if there is a contract of employment. If the em-
ployer is an infant he may disaffirm his contract but he can not
avoid or evade the statutory liability as to compensation where
the accident happens prior to any such disaffirmance.
7
Whether or not an aviator who entertains gaping crowds by
executing somersaults and spiral glides exceeds the limits of gross
negligence and becomes guilty of such daredeviltry and foolhardi-
ness as to amount to willful misconduct within the meaning of the
act will depend to some extent on what he is employed to do.,
Clearly, however, an aviator who at the time of the accident (no
matter what he may have done previously) performs only straight-
away flying and crashes in consequence of the vacuum created
in the air by the explosion of a bomb below his machine while
flying for a moving picture company is within the protection of
the act.9  The hazards attending on the occupation of an aviator
far from taking him out of the protection of the act may even
bring him within the definition of "hazardous employment" for-
mulated by the act.' 0
The decisive question in many cases is whether the claimant
was an employee or an independent contractor at the time of the
injury. If he was an independent contractor no liability under
the act would arise.
The test by which to determine this question is the ultimate
control over the work. The exclusiveness of the occupation, the
manner of compensation, the source of the material and appliances,
the right to "hire and fire" and the general recognition of the work
as being done under an employment are merely elements which
assist in determining where the ultimate control is." This right
to control should not be confused with the ability to control wisely.
A pilot employed to fly the president of a tool company on com-
pany business in the president's airplane, whose wages while so
acting (about three days a week) are paid by the company but are
not included in the payroll on which premiums for compensation
insurance are calculated, is an employee of the company and not
7. Rohman v. Bethal, 258 N. Y. S. 286 (1932).
8. The situation of a moving-picture flyer will differ materially from
that of a transport pilot in regard to what he is employed to do.
For a case not arising in connection with workmen's compensation, but
valuable as holding a stunt pilot under contract with a moving-picture com-
pany to be an independent contractor, see Montijo v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc. of
Cal., 65 Cal. App. Dec. 72, 297 P. 949 (1931).
9. Stites v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 2 Cal. I. A. C. 653 (1915).
10. Fort Smith Aircraft Co. v. State Industrial Commission, 151 Okla. 67,
1 P. (2d) 682 (1931).
11. Texas Employers Ins. Assn. v. Kelly. 56 S. W. (2d) 1108 (1932).
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an independent contractor though he naturally will take only gen-
.eral directions from such president.12
Other examples can easily be supplied. A pilot who enters
into an agreement with an airplane owner to take up passengers
on occasions for a circular ride and to instruct students, his com-
pensation being fixed at 40% of the sums received while the owner
assumes all the expenses of keeping the plane in condition and fuel,
is an employee and not an independent contractor. The owner
is in control though the pilot collects the money in his absence and
though the -pilot is in custody of the plane while operating it.1'
Though an officer of the immediate employer of the pilot is in the
airplane while moving-pictures are being taken where such offi-
cer exercises no control or direction but the pilot receives all of
his instructions as to time, place and method of flight from the
moving-picture company, the relation of both general and special
employer exists and the pilot may recover compensation from the
moving-picture company.14 A person who conducts an airport
and makes an arrangement with the owner of an airplane to pilot
such airplane for such owner at $10 per hour when he is other-
wise free and who receives his instructions from such owner or
the owner's brother-in-law is an employee and not an independent
contractor. 5 The same is true of a pilot who undertakes to fly
an airplane from Missouri to California in consideration of his
expenses and with the purpose of increasing his flying experience
where the only discretion reposed in the pilot is in the choice of
the routes, everything else being directed by the owner of the air-
plane who, however, remains in California.16
Where the claimant is conceded to be an employee the most
important question will be whether the particular act which led to
his injury or death was within or beyond the scope of his author-
ity. If he acted beyond his authority his employer clearly is not
liable. No hard and fast rule can be formulated. All that can
be done is to trace the process of judicial inclusion and exclusion
12. Idom.
13. Hinds v. Department of Labor & Industry of State of Wash., 150
Wash. 230. 272 P. 734 (1928).
14. Famous Player-Lasky Corp. v. Ind. Accident Comm., 194 Cal. 134,
228 P. 5, 34 A. L. R. 765 (1924). Compare Montijo v. Samuel Goldwyn Inc.,
of Cal., cit. note 8.
15. Meyer v. Industrial Commission, 347 Ill. 173, 179 N. E. 456 (1932).
For a note, see 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 316-320.
16. The fact that the compensation is merely sufficient to meet his ex-
penses during his employment does not affect his status. A person may work
for his board and lodging and during such employment is just as much an
employee as if he were paid a stipulated sum per day. The amount of his
wage has no bearing on his relation with his employer. Murray v. Industrial
Accident Commission of Cal.. 216 Cal. 340, 14 P. (2d) 301 (1932), reversing
10 P. (2d) 97 (1932).
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as applied to aviation cases. Such will be the purpose of the
following pages.
The rule is well established that an injury is compensable
when it is sustained in performing an act which is fairly incident
to the prosecution of the master's business though such act may
not be performed at the building or premises where the major part
of the work of the employee is performed. Where, therefore, an
airport employee gives instruction in flying to students he remains
within the scope of his employment though he takes the airplane
some distance away from the airport. Owing to the very nature
of his work such instruction flights cannot be confined to the
boundaries of the airport or the space above the airport.17 Simi-
larly an employee of an auto brokerage company who while crank-
ing an airplane at an airport in the course of repairing it as a
mechanic acts within the course of his employment. There cer-
tainly is no difference between cranking an airplane or cranking
an automobile, truck or tractor engine under like circumstances. '8
Other examples can be readily supplied. A licensed pilot who
in order to increase his flying experience flies an airplane from
Missouri to California acts within the course of his employment
though his compensation is confined to his expenses and though
the manufacturer delivers to him another airplane than that con-
tracted for.10 A test flight made by a salesman after a new pro-
pellor has been installed is a proper precaution and is within his
employment. It is to the interest of the employer that the air-
plane operate properly so as to permit the salesman to go from
place to place as rapidly as possible thereby giving the employer
the benefit of the additional time gained to devote to the sale of
the employer's goods. 20 The manager of a moving-picture theatre
who in the performance of his duty to bring all possible trade to
the theatre attends various civic activities, trade excursions, mem-
bership drives, and so forth, in various parts of the state acts
within the "usual course of the trade, business, profession or oc-
cupation of his employer" when he boards an airplane to fly to
another city for the purpose of advertising his employer's busi-
ness.2 1 The chief inspector of an airplane manufacturing company
17. Fort Smith Aircraft Co. v. State Industrial Comm., cit. note 10.
18. Standard Accid. Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 1 S. W. (2d) 434 (Tex. Civ. App.,
1927).
19. The airplane contracted for had the serial number N.C. 10983. The
plane flown was numbered N.C. 10984. Murray v. Indust. Accid. Comm. of Cal.,
cit. note 16.
20. Hammer v. General Electric X-Ray Corp., 1932 U. S. Av. R. 242
(Minn. Indust. Comm., 1931). 'For a very simllar case, see Schonberg v.
Zinsmaster Baking Co., 173 Minn. 414, 217 N. W. 491 (1928).
21. Constitution Indemnity Co. v. Shytles, 47 F. (2d) 441 (1931). For a
note, see 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 137.
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who after the plant has worked over-time to make an airplane
ready for delivery on the next day enters the airplane to examine
the inspection cards and to sign the packing sheets and stays in it
while the operations despatcher "revvs" the engine and proceeds
to fly the plane to the storage hangar (about a mile from the
manufacturing plant) is acting within the course of his employ-
ment.22 A pilot regularly employed by the manufacturer of ver-
toplanes to test them does not cease to be an employee of the
manufacturer by accepting a bonus of $100 from the purchaser
of the plane and by being told by the vice-president of the manu-
facturing company before the test that he is "fired" so far as the
manufacturer is concerned.23 The fact that an X-ray equipment
salesman who uses an airplane for travel disregards his employer's
directions to take out liability insurance covering persons other
than himself does not take him outside of the course of his
employment.
2 4
What cases are to be excluded is a question of approximately
equal importance. On this question the decided cases while not
quite so numerous are numerous enough to afford substantial help.
A person who works for the owner of a garage as a salesman
and mechanic is not "performing services growing out of and in-
cident to his employment" when he goes up in his employer's air-
plane for the purpose of distributing circulars advertising a
"Booster Day" for the merchants of his community.2 5 A pilot who
gives acquaintances a free ride solely for their amusement with-
out in any manner benefiting his employer acts outside the scope
of his employment. Where he, at the instigation of the passengers
or otherwise to gratify their or his own desire for an extraordi-
nary thrill, voluntarily undertakes a power dive, thus subjecting
his employer's property to great and needless peril instead of
saving and protecting it by all the means within his power, he is
clearly not entitled to compensation.2 6  The same is true in in-
creasing measure of a pilot engaged to transport passengers who
engages in acrobatic flying 700 feet above a crowd of 8,000 per-
sons without the permission of his employer thus violating the
criminal code.2 7 An employee of a Petroleum Company who owns
22. Crutcher v. Curtiss-Robertson Airplane MIg. Co., 331 Mo. 169, 52
S. W. (2d) 1019 (1932). For a note, see 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 116.
23. Lambert v. Heath. Aircraft Corp., 1932 U. S. Av. R. 238 (Mich. Dept.
of Labor & Industry).
24. Hammer v. General Electric X-Ray Corp., cit. note 20.
25. Indrebo V. Industrial Commission of Wisc., 209 Wis. 272, 243 N. W.
464 (1932).
26. Sheboygan Airways, Inc. V. Field, 209 Wis. 352, 245 N. W. 178 (1932).
For a note, see 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 464.
27. Datin V. Vale, 1931 U. S. Av. IL 175 (Pa. Dept. of Labor & Industry,
1931).
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an unlicensed airplane and has no pilot license but uses the air-
plane in violation of the criminal law and without his employer's
knowledge to obtain balls and seats for his employer's pumping
machinery from a city forty, miles away easily reached by an
automobile furnished by the employer voluntarily exposes him-
self to a peril which is not necessarily or inherently or reasonably
incident to his work and cannot recover compensation. 8 A stu-
dent flyer who accommodates a pilot by starting his motor is not
within an insurance policy which insures against damages suffered
in the course of his employment.2 9
Another important question may arise in connection with em-
ployment, namely, what is necessary to constitute one an em-
ployer. A land appraiser who steps out of his regular calling to
engage in an endeavor to sell airplanes as a sideline and who asks
another to fly an airplane purchased by him and supposed to be
the newest thing in aviation from Missouri to California is not
making a casual employment but is in the course of a business in
which he is attempting to establish himself. The fact that he
has at the time made no sales of airplanes does therefore not render
the services of the pilot in flying the machine as without the scope
of that business.8 0 Where an airway company has on various
occasions employed from three to five persons, some of whom are
its own officers, in moving and preparing its airplane for service
and in soliciting and handling passengers and has compensated
these persons by giving them a ride and instructing them in flying,
the relation of employer and employees exists within the pro-
vision of a compensation act requiring three or more employees.8 1
Workmen's compensation commissions are generally regarded
and treated as fact finding bodies whose determinations of fact
will not be disturbed by the courts if they are supported by evi-
dence. Though therefore the preponderance of the evidence is in
favor of the claimant and though there is also a statutory pre-
sumption of employment, thus casting on the defendant the burden
of overcoming the presumptions, the determination of the commis-
sion in the presence of conflicting evidence that the relation exist-
ing was not that of employer and employee will not be disturbed.2
28. Bugh v. Employers' Re-insurance Corp., 63 F. (2d) 36 (1933). For
a note, see 4 JOURNAL OF AiR LAW 436.
29. Judgment of the Prussian Insurance Court at Dortmund, 1 Archlv
ftir Luftrecht 100.
30. Murray v. Industrial Accident Ins. Comm. 01 Cal., cit. note 16.
a1. Sheboygan Airways, Ine. v. Field, 209 Wis. 352. 245 N. W. 178 (1932).
The cases above abstracted will suggest other employer situations which need
not be further gone into now.
32. Gale v. State Industrial Accident Comm., 80 Cal. Dec. 633, 294 P. 391
(1930). The findings of fact made by the commission on the question of
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The duty of the court in reviewing the award made is not to weigh
conflicting evidence but merely to ascertain whether there is evi-
dence to support the findings of fact.33
Most important industrial concerns prefer to insure against
liability under workmen's compensation acts rather than to carry
this risk themselves. This may involve a practical difficulty so far
as aviation is concerned. Insurance companies are inclined either
to refuse to write such insurance or to make the premium pro-
hibitive. It may follow that to include the business of aviation in
the compensation act will work the ruin of such business because
of this insurance difficulty. This, however, is a matter for the
consideration of the legislature and not for the consideration of
the courts.34 Of course, where insurance has once been effected,
the question as to whether an employee is covered by the policy or
not is determined by the statutes, the policy, and the general nature
of his employment and not by the question as to whether the par-
ticular thing which he was doing was more or less hazardous and
if customarily engaged in would have been subject to a higher
rate of premium.
A construction of the Workmen's Compensation Law which would put
a workman engaged in the business of his employer now within and now
without the coverage of the policy according to the changing hazards of the
particular tasks upon which he might from time to time be engaged, because
of the difference in premium rates applicable to the different classes of
work customarily engaged in, would be not only un-workable, but
intolerable8 5
The fact that the compensation of a pilot who pilots the presi-
dent of a tool company about three times a week, which is paid
by the company, is not included in the payroll of the company on
which premiums for the policy are computed will not be a defense
to the insurance company.
86
The place where an employee is killed may be an important
factor in applying the proper workmen's compensation act. It
has therefore been held that a resident of New York, drowned in
New Jersey while employed by a Delaware corporation having an
office in New York to work on a New Jersey airport, who has
employment will not be disturbed unless entirely without support In the evi-
dence. Indrebo v. Industrial Comm., cit. note 25.
33. Soule v. McHenry, 286 Pa- 49, 132 A. 799 (1926). The award in this
case was In favor of the pilot. See also: Colonial Air Transport, Inc. v.
Tallman, cit. notes 2 and 3; Fort Smith Aircraft Co. v. State Industrial Comm.,
cit. note 10; Jackson v. Curtiss-Wright Airplane Co., Mo. 68 S. W.
(2d) 715 (1933).
34. Fort Smith Aircraft Co. v. State Industrial Comm., cit. note 10.
35. Constitution Indemnity Co. v. Shytles, cit. note 21.
36. Texas Employers' Ins. Assn. v. Kelly, cit. note 11.
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never worked for the corporation before, is not employed within
the state of New York so as to be entitled to compensation under
the New York Compensation Act.37
An airport with its hangars and repair shops is a factory with-
in the meaning of the workmen's compensation act.38 The deci-
sion of the Connecticut court that a newspaper reporter who puts
his head out of the window of a street-car in order to observe
the better an airplane exhibition some distance away is, acting
within the course of his employment, is referred to herewith for
completeness rather than for any other reason.8 9
37. Baum V. New York Air Terminal, Inc., 230 App. Dlv. 531, 245 N. Y.
S. 357 (1930). Compare Jackson v. Curtiss-Wright Airplane Co., cit. note 33.
38. Fort Smith Aircraft Co. v. State Industrial Comm., cit. note 10.
39. Kinsman v. Hartford Courant Co., 94 Conn. 156, 108 A. 562 (1919).
